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Abstract 
This study tested the effect of auditors’ choice on financing decision of quoted 
firms in Nigeria from 2010 to 2014. To successfully carry out this study, the 
study reviewed various literatures and theoretical issues such as the Modigliani-
miller’s theorem, and asymmetric of information hypothesis. Secondary data of 
the big four, size and return on assets were obtained from financial statement of 
conglomerate listed firms on the Nigeria stock exchange for 5 years. The data 
were analyzed using linear regression method to achieve the effect of auditor’s 
choice on financing decision. The findings of the study reflect the effect of debit 
capital which are as follows: an increase on the size of the company (SZ) by 1% 
would lead to an increase in debit capital (DC) by about 648.7%. The study 
shows that companies with BIG4 auditors have less debt and more equity in their 
capital structure and are less likely to issue debt. This study may be developed 
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by considering the effect of political and economic institutions on the choice of 
auditors in Nigeria. 
Keywords: Auditors’ Choice; External Auditor; Financing Decision; Debt 
Financing and Equity Financing 
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Introduction 
Auditing promotes financial stability, re-establishing trust and market confidence for 
investors and other interested stakeholders. Financial reporting’s main goal is to make 
available useful information for making investment, credit, and similar resource 
allocation decisions (IASB, 2011).As a consequence, high quality information is a pre-
requisite for the well-functioning of the capital markets likewise the economy. The users 
of financial statement can rely on information verified by independent auditors because 
it confirms the reliability of this information. An audit report is seen as a relevant 
informational tool for stakeholders (Okere, Ogundana, Adetula, Adesanmi & Lawal, 
2017). 
Auditing has long been identified as a playing governance role in mitigating the agency 
concerns in firms. Auditing promotes value creation firm by reducing the incentive 
problems that arise due to agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The financial 
statements obviously play a critical role in reducing this asymmetry information and their 
integrity is essential to well-functioning capital markets, (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1993).Information asymmetry creates a need for an independent intermediary, the 
auditor, to verify and provide reasonable assurance of financial accounting reports, 
prepared by management. The role of the audit therefore, is to fortify trust and uphold 
confidence in financial reporting.As such, audits help augment economic prosperity, 
increasing the variety, number and value of transactions that people are prepared to 
venture into (ICAEW, 2005). 
Ever since the corporate collapses (such as the Enron and WorldCom scandals) and 
High profile cases like Oceanic Bank, Intercontinental Bank, Afribank and Cadbury 
(Nigeria) which some of their collapse were due to poor management, but many due to 
fraud, governments across the globe have been looking for ways to avoid similar 
situations. These corporate disasters and the apparent increase in corporate fraud and 
unethical business conduct have raised many questions to the functions of auditors and 
financial reporting. Thus, reducing the level of trust and confidence in these financial 
reports since the management is accountable for the financial reporting and in addition 
has a position to exercise will, a risk exists that the information is erroneous, the 
‘information risk’. Information asymmetry creates a niche for an independent 
intermediary, the auditor, to verify and provide assurance of financial accounting reports, 
prepared by management. 
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The information asymmetry not only exists in the equity capital market, but also causes 
big difficulties in debt capital markets. This explains the motive why scholars continue 
searching for the association between audit report and financing decisions as a way to 
reduce interest expense on corporations. Choosing a Big 4 auditor may lead to more 
credible financial statements for example, improving the accuracy in firms’ earnings 
(DeAngelo 1981; Balvers, McDonald, and Miller 1998), which in competitive debt 
markets moderates contracting costs because creditors will not have to resort to spending 
resources on gathering this information from other sources. The rationale of appointing 
external auditors is to promote efficient ways of upholding accountability in complex 
establishments where management interests could be at variancefrom shareholder 
interests (Ekumankama & Uche, 2009) 
In Nigeria, some studies have examined a differential ways at which audit 
characteristics affect the performance of firms or the financial decision of firms,but the 
outcome seemsto have been questionable. For instance, studies on the factors affecting 
audit quality found non audit service as the significant factor affecting audit quality, size 
of the company and business leverage, (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2010) while in industrial 
economics, degree of corporate complexity and  risk are the main determinants of audit 
quality and fees, (Omar, 2007). However, most studies in Nigeria fail to focus on the 
relationship between auditor’s choice and quoted firms.The theoretical literature brings 
light to the fact that large auditing firms (Big Four) provide superior auditing services 
than smaller auditors because they have greater monitoring ability, more valuable 
reputation to protect and they have “deeper pockets” in case of litigation (Dye ,1993). 
Consequently, the choice of auditor in determining the financial performance of a firm 
improves the reputation of such firm amongst competing firms. 
To this end, this study aim to determine the effect of auditors’ choice on financing 
decision with respect to long-term debt of selected quoted firms in Nigeria; and also to 
determine the impact of auditor’s choice on equity capital of the selected firms.  
Therefore, this study attempt to find answers to the following questions: 
i. How does the auditors’ choice affect long terms debts of the selected firms? 
i. To what extent does the choice of auditors’ impact the equity capital of the 
selected firms? 
Literature review 
Auditor’s choice 
The auditor choice is a decision where company managers need to assess the marginal 
benefits and marginal costs in hiring a specific auditor. In the literature, the main 
peculiarity between audit firms used, is the one between high‐quality auditors and non‐
high‐quality auditors. 
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Theoretical framework 
The theory upon which the study is founded is the Agency Theory. The Agency Theory 
is based on the relationship between the principal (owners) and the agent (managers). 
Theories considered in the study are as follows: 
The Modigliani-Miller’s Theorem 
The Modigliani-Miller’s theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958) is a theory of capital 
structure. They assume that a perfect capital market has no transaction or bankruptcy 
costs, and people receive perfect information. Hence, entities can borrow at the same 
interest rate devoid of taxes and their investment decisions would not be affected by 
financing decisions. Based on the assumptions, Modigliani and Miller (1958) state the 
value of a firm is independent how that it is financed because its value is dependent on 
the profitability of the firm. Therefore, the firm does not an optimal capital structure. 
However, the real world reflects that firm’s value is relevant with its bankruptcy costs, 
agency costs, taxes, information asymmetry and so on.  
The Trade-off Theory 
The trade-off theory of capital structure refers to the idea that a firm decide on how 
much debt finance and how much equity finance to use through cost-benefit analysis. An 
important purpose of the theory is to clarify the fact that organizations usually are 
financed partly with debt and partly with equity. 
The Market Timing Theory 
This is conveyed up by Baker and Wurgler (2002). They use the market-to-book ratio 
to size the market timing opportunities observed by managers. Otherwise, they construct 
a historical market-to-book ratio (external finance weighted-average market-to-book 
ratio, EFWAMB) to capture firm’s past equity market timing attempts. Also present in 
this theory, there is no optimal capital structure, so market timing financing decisions just 
accrue over time into the capital structure outcome. However, the market-to-book ratio of 
equity plays a dual role in empirical studies. It is used as a measure of market mispricing 
(over or under-pricing) and is utilized as a proxy for future growth opportunities in the 
trade-off framework. Firms with higher growth opportunities, which typically have higher 
valuations, may prefer to lower their leverage to maintain their financial flexibility 
(Myers, 1977). Flannery and Rangan (2006), Kayhan and Titman (2007) disagree with 
Baker and Wurgler on the persistence of the effect on capital structure. Contrary to Baker 
and Wurgler (2002), finds that the importance of historical average market-to-book ratios 
in leverage regressions is not due to past equity market timing. 
Agency Cost Theory 
It recommends that the optimal capital structure is determined by agency cost, which 
up shoots from conflict of interest amongst different recipients (Jensen and Mackling, 
1976). From a theoretical point of view, an organization may be perceived as a set of 
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principal-agent relationships more or less ranked in which several agents may also exert 
their function as principal towards others. Each actor or group of actors will try to act so 
as to satisfy their own wellbeing. Optimal financial structure is one which allows 
resolving differences of interest between agents, so as to maximize the total value of the 
firm.  Capital structure may affect the value of a company, acting on how to motivate 
managers and on the conflicts of interest that may exist between shareholders and 
creditors, resulting in the probability of bankruptcy and urging shareholders and creditors 
to supervise the managers and limit the abuse. 
Empirical review of literature 
DeAngelo (1981) posits that the auditor independence is the joint probability that 
auditors will find and report misstatements in the financial statements. She argues that the 
quality of an auditing firm is positively linked with firm size or the firm’s market share. 
Diamond (1989) argues that young firms suffer more severe asset substitution and moral 
hazard problems. He models the dynamics of borrowers’ incentives with lenders learning 
over time from observing firms’ credit records Lang (1991) provides theory and evidence 
that the magnitude of stock price reactions to earnings announcements diminish with age, 
which he interprets as indicating that firm-specific information, is gradually revealed over 
time. 
Becker et al., (1998) states: “auditing reduces information asymmetry that exists 
between managers and firm stakeholders by allowing outsiders to verify the validity of 
financial statements.” Francis et al., (1999) find that firms with otherwise relatively high 
uncertainty about reported earnings are induced to hire a Big Six auditor to bolster the 
credibility of their financial statements. They report evidence that this external monitoring 
constrains aggressive and potentially opportunistic reporting of accruals-based earnings. 
Francis and Krishnan (2005) contend that larger auditors provide higher-quality audits in 
order to protect their own reputations and to avoid costly litigations. Despite some recent 
high-profile cases (e.g., Arthur Andersen),  the collective evidence is strongly supportive 
that large audit firms can provide higher quality audits and better monitoring (Ireland & 
Lennox, 2002; Lee et al., 2003; Lennox, 2005;Watkins, Hillison, & Morecroft, 2004).  
Willenborg (1999) finds that auditor size is negatively related to IPO underpricing (a 
setting where information asymmetry is expected to be particularly strong), while Mansi 
et al., (2004) and Pittman and Fortin (2004) find that larger auditors (proxied by whether 
they are a Big Six firm or not) are associated with a lower cost of debt for their clients. 
Lennox (1999) examined the relationship between bankruptcy and auditor switch and the 
result showed that a switch is a weak signal of financial distress. Maybe one of the reasons 
that these relationship have not supported was that the samples were small and they did 
not consider the other factors related to auditor switch. DeFondet al., (2000) reported that 
the independence of auditing practices in China had been improving, as evidenced by the 
increasing frequency of the modified opinions (non-standard audit reports) issued by 
Chinese auditors. DeFond et al., (2000) found that big auditors were more likely to issue 
the qualified opinions in China. Since audit quality is positively related to the size of 
auditing firms, we posit that large auditing firms should provide higher-quality auditing 
services in China. 
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Similarly, Pittman and Fortman (2002) find evidence consistent with Diamond’s 
prediction that firms lower their interest rates by developing their reputations in debt 
markets. Dunn and Mayhew (2004) document a positive relationship between audit 
quality and disclosure quality, measured as firm-wide industry specialization and AIMR 
disclosure score, respectively. Khurana and Raman (2004) states, that the ability to detect 
material error in the financial statements is a function of auditor competence while the 
propensity to correct/reveal the material error is a function of auditor independence from 
the client. Fan and Wong (2005) document a positive relationship between the Big4 
auditor choice and the wedge of vote-cash flow rights in East Asia companies, thus 
showing how Asian family firms signal their motivations to small investors. 
Also, Guedhami, Pittman and Saffar (2007) find strong, robust evidence from panel 
data estimation that privatized companies globally become less (more) likely to appoint 
a Big Four auditor with the presence of state (foreign) owners even though expectations 
are foreign owners will prefer to hire a Big Four auditor to better monitor the newly 
privatized organizations to inhibit expropriation by controlling insiders and their political 
backers. 
Methodology 
This study covers the effect of auditor choice on financing decision of quoted firms in 
Nigeria. This implies that all aspect of the Big Four auditing firm with respect to 
suitability in the Nigerian firm is covered in this study. This study evaluates conglomerate 
firms listed on the Nigeria Stock Exchange (NSE), which includes; A.G. leventis Nig. 
Plc; Chellarams Plc; John Holt Plc; SCOA Nig. Plc; Transnational Corporation of Nig. 
Plc; and UACN Plc; for a period of five (5) years from 2010 to 2014.Based on the 
theoretical framework and the Modigliani-Miller’s theorem, this study adopted the linear 
regression model. Due to our dependent variable (financing decision) combination of real 
numbers and binary variable, we used regression technique to confirm the relationship 
between financing decision and independent variables.  
𝐹𝐷 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐷 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑧 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝜀 
Where, FD = financing decision which includes real value of debt or real value of 
equity 
AD = auditor choice  
SZ = size 
ROA= return on assets  
It is expected that the choice of auditor, size and deposit asset should have a positive 
impact on the financing decisions. Symbolically, it is expected that α> 0, β >0 and Ө > 0. 
Financing decision: proxies by total value of debt or equity, it is measured by the sum of 
the market value of equity and the book value of total debt. 
Auditor report: proxies by the Big Four which are Akintola Williams Deloitte; Ernst 
& Young (E & Y); Klynveld, Peat, Marwick and Goerdeler (KPMG) and 
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PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC).This is measured by companies that use Big Four will 
take 1 and 0 for companies not using Big Four auditors.  
Size:  Proxy by total assets of the firms. 
Return on assets: Proxy by the ratio of profit and loss to total assets. 
This study made use of secondary data spanning from 2010 to 2014. This study has 
specified two objectives. The two objectives were analyzed using statistical package for 
social science (Linear Regression). The secondary data used was collected from financial 
reports from conglomerate companies listed on NSE from 2010 to 2014. The data 
collected would be used to analyze the impact of financing decisions on auditor choice 
and report. 
Findings 
Analysis of Auditor’s Choice and Long-term Debt of Selected Quoted Firms in 
Nigeria. 
Table 1 Effect of Auditor’s Choice on Long-term Debt 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C -89.987 30.895 -2.913 0.007 
LOG (SIZE) 6.487 1.938 3.347 0.002 
ROA -0.113 0.061 -1.858 0.074 
BIG 4 -9.823 2.732 -3.596 0.001 
R-squared 0.405 Mean dependent variable 8.2817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.337 S.D. dependent variable 7.00021 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.283 Prob.(F-statistic) 0.000 
Sum squared residual 844.967 F-statistic 5.909 
Dependent Variable: LOG (Debt Capital) 
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Auditor’s Choice on Equity Capital of 
Selected Firms.  
Table 2: Impact of auditor’s choice on equity capital 
Dependent Variable: LOG (Equity Capital) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 24.943 3.596 6.936 0.0000 
LOG(SZ) -0.635 0.226 -2.817 0.0090 
ROA 0.002 0.007 0.275 0.7850 
BIG4 1.740 0.318 5.470 0.0000 
R-squared 0.538 Mean dependent variable 8.2817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.485 S.D. dependent variable 0.67782 
Sum squared residual 11.449 F-statistic 10.086 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.929 Prob. (F-statistic) 0.0000 
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Interpretation of result and discussion  
Table 1, the R-squared value of (0.405) shows how the variations in Debt Capital (DC) 
are explained by Size of the company (SZ), Return on assets (ROA) and Auditor choice 
(BIG4). Thus, this high value of R-squared means that the model has a good fit. The F-
Statistic value is highly significant and the explanatory variables are capable of explaining 
the variation in Debt at 5% level. This implies that the model is statistically significant. 
The value of the Durbin-Watson stat is (1.283) indicates that there is no auto correlation 
because it is relatively close to 2, the absence of auto correlation shows that the 
independent variables are truly independent.  
The coefficient of the Size of the company (SZ) is positive (6.487) and significant at 
five per cent significant level, implying that the company size has positive significant 
effect on Debt capital and one per cent increase in the size of the company would increase 
the debt capital by 648.7%. The coefficient of  Return of assets (ROA) is positive (-0.113) 
and significant at five per cent significant level implying that the return on assets has 
negative significant effect on debit capital and one per cent increase on return on assets 
would decrease the debit capital by 11.3%. Also the coefficient of Auditor choice (BIG4) 
is negative (-9.823) and significant at five per cent significant level implying that the 
auditor choice would decrease the debt capital by 98.23%. This means that there is a 
significant relationship between the firms audited by Big Four companies and the debt 
capital.  
Table 2, R-squared value of (0.538) shows how the variation in Equity Capital (EC) 
are explained by Size of the company (SZ), Return on assets (ROA) and Auditor choice 
(BIG4). Thus, this high value of R-squared that the model has a good fit. The F-Statistic 
value is high significant and the explanatory variable are capable of explaining the 
variation in Equity at 5% level. This implies that the model is statistically significant. The 
value of the Durbin-Watson stat is (0.929) indicates that there is auto correlation because 
it is not in any way close to 2, the presence of auto correlation shows that the independent 
variables are truly independent.  
The coefficient of the Size of the company (SZ) is negative (-0.635) and insignificant 
significant level, implying that the company size has a negative significant effect on 
Equity capital. The coefficient of Return of assets (ROA) is positive (0.002) and 
insignificant level implying that the return on assets has positive insignificant effect on 
equity capital.  In contrast to the above, the co-efficient of Auditor choice (BIG4) is 
positive (1.740) and significant at five per cent significant level implying that the auditor 
choice would increase the equity capital by 174%. This shows that there is significant 
relationship between the firms audited by Big Four companies and the equity capital. 
Conclusions  
In this study, Big 4 audit firms are considered to be “high-quality” auditors and 
consequently they provide a higher perceived and actual audit quality. Big 4 auditors play 
an essential role in capital market to provide credible financial information to the 
investors. The auditor’s opinion can, to some extent, influent stock prices and cost of debt 
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when it conveys information for future cash flows and expectation of firms’ viability. The 
study examines three (3) variables namely: Size (SZ), Return on Assets (ROA), Auditor 
Choice (BIG4) on financing decision and provides evidence that the difference in 
information asymmetry associated with higher quality auditors affects companies 
financing choices.  The study shows that companies with BIG4 auditors have less debt in 
their capital structure and are less likely to issue debt. They financed a smaller portion of 
their deficit with debt. Secondly, these companies with BIG4 auditors depend less on 
market conditions for their equity decisions. 
Policy recommendations 
Based on the research outcomes and conclusions made, the following 
recommendations are made: 
1. Researchers can improve this study by carrying out investigation on the effect of 
other factors on auditor choice, such as the features of board of directors in 
Nigeria.  
2. This study may be improved upon by including more variables that may affect 
audit quality 
3. The study recommends that more researchers should carry out investigation on 
indirect effects of auditor choices such as cost of capital and cost of litigation. 
4. This study may be improved by analyzing how political and economic institutions 
affect the choice of auditors in Nigeria. 
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